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1. Introduction 
For the 2009 spring Bank Holiday Monday, the Met Office and the BBC forecasted constant 
thundery showers in Bournemouth, a large coastal resort town in the south-west of England. Indeed, 
temperatures of 22 °C made it one of the hottest day of the year. According to Mark Smith, head of 
Bournemouth council’s tourism department, inaccurate weather reports led to the loss of 25,000 
visitors, and an estimated cost of over a milion pounds.1 Similar concerns are expressed by Italian 
tourism entrepreneurs. For the 2009 Easter weekend, hotel owners in the Province of Rimini, one of 
the leading seaside resorts in the north of Italy,  publicly blamed overly pessimistic weather 
forecasts by a leading national TV channel.2 Following wrong forecasts on two spring weekends in 
2010, which caused, according to hotel owners, a 3 million euro loss, the Veneto region, one of the 
leading Italian tourist regions, decided to establish a public-private partnership to produce specific 
weather forecasts for Jesolo, an important tourism town in the province of Venice.3  
The above examples, and there are many others, suggest the importance that tourism firms attribute 
to weather forecasts. This judgment seems correct: according to Confesercenti, an Italian business 
association, 76% of Italian tourists usually consult weather forecasts when organizing their 
holiday.4 Weather forecasts are a crucial factor affecting tourism demand, especially for short 
holidays, or excursions, in which tourists do not book or, if they do, they do so only a few days in 
advance. For many tourist destinations, this form of tourism constitutes an increasingly important 
source of activity and income. 
The aim of this paper is to model the decisions of tourists and firms when weather forecasts are 
available. For this reason, we develop a model to help in understanding the effects of weather 
                                                          
1 Bournemouth Echo, “Poor weather forecast cost Bournemouth millions, says council”, 28th May, 2009, retrieved at 
www.bournemouthecho.co.uk. 
2 Il Resto del Carlino, “Meteo terroristi smentiti per pasqua”, 14th April, 2009. 
3 Il Mattino di Padova, “Meteo federalista, Jesolo avrà le sue previsioni del tempo”, 13th January, 2011. 
4 “Estate 2011: Confesercenti-Swg, 7 su 10 gli italiani in vacanza”, available at www.confesercenti.it. 
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forecasts, and in particular their accuracy, on tourists and firm decisions, and, in turn, on their 
welfare. The model considers a single tourist firm facing a population of tourists who have 
heterogeneous tastes with respect to the utility they attach to holiday consumption. Moreover, their 
utility is also affected by a state of the world, which corresponds to “good weather” or “bad 
weather”. Before deciding whether to go on holiday or not, but after the firm has decided and 
posted its price, tourists can look at a signal about the state of the world, i.e. the weather forecast. 
Therefore, tourists’ demand is conditional on the signal they receive, while the tourist firm chooses 
its price in order to maximize its expected profit.  
Our results show that the price chosen by the firm and the corresponding equilibrium profit are 
decreasing as a function of the accuracy of weather forecasts.  Clearly, low levels of accuracy in 
weather forecasts harm the firm (and possibly the consumers) when forecasters erroneously predict 
bad weather, as the examples previously reported suggest, but benefit the firm when forecasters 
erroneously predict good weather. A priori, then, the effect is ambiguous. It turns out that, by 
making tourists more informed, forecast accuracy reduces demand elasticity following a good 
signal, and this pushes the firm to raise its price. The opposite happens following a bad signal, and 
the latter effect prevails. Therefore, the model shows that a lack of accuracy in weather forecasts is 
in fact beneficial for firms. As for both managerial and policy implications, we suggest that the 
definition of what is a good or a bad state is crucial. Indeed, a good weather state can be interpreted 
as those weather (exogenous) conditions that are necessary for tourists to express a positive 
evaluation of their holiday. Such an evaluation, in turn, will depend on the level of utility that the 
firm and the destination manager can (endogenously) provide to tourists. This implies that 
appropriate investments by the firm and the destination authority can mitigate the negative impact 
of more accurate weather forecasting.  
In tourism research, a significant number of papers have considered the effect of weather and 
climate conditions on tourism demand and destination attractiveness (Harrison et al., 1999; 
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Lohmann and Kaim, 1999; Hamilton et al., 2005; Gomez-Martin, 2005; Berrittella et al., 2006; 
Agnew and Palutikof, 2006; Alvarez-Diaz and Rossello-Nadal, 2010). These works, which adopt 
different methodologies, confirm the importance of weather and climate for tourism in several 
dimensions. 
In addition, there is an interdisciplinary literature studying the economic impact of weather 
forecasts (Katz and Murphy, 1997a). Several case studies have been produced, studying the impact 
of weather forecasts on specific sectors, including agriculture (Mjelde and Penson, 2000), energy 
(Considine et al., 2004), fishery (Costello et al., 1998) and transportation (Craft, 1998). However, 
evidence for the tourism sector is negligible. As a theoretical background, this literature usually 
uses a Bayesian rational choice approach, in which a single decision-maker must take action whose 
value depends on realized weather conditions (Katz and Murphy, 1997b; Nelson and Winter, 1964; 
Cerdá Tena and Quiroga Gómez, 2011). Our model is close to this approach, but it also considers 
explicitly the interaction of decisions between the supply side and the demand side of the market.5 
In tourism, and this is shared by other sectors such as agriculture, the quality of the good supplied 
by a firm is also determined by factors such as weather conditions, which are not under the control 
of either the firm or the consumers (Candela and Cellini, 1998); however, what is peculiar about 
tourism is that weather forecasts can directly affect consumers’ behaviour. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, while in Section 3 the main 
results are presented and discussed. In Section 4 we further elaborate on the results, by deriving 
implications for firm strategy and destination management. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
The model can be summarized as follows. Two sets of agents are considered: i) tourists and ii) a 
tourist firm (a hotel) acting as a monopolist in the tourist destination. Tourists are heterogeneous in 
                                                          
5 For a model considering the effect of weather forecasting on firms in a competitive market, see Babcock (1990). 
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terms of their willingness to pay for the service sold by the firm (i.e. the holiday), and such a 
willingness to pay also depends on weather conditions. Weather forecasts are available to tourists 
before they make their decision (buying or not buying the holiday) but after the firm has chosen its 
price, which is assumed not to be contingent on realized weather conditions or weather forecasts. 
The details of the demand and the supply sides of the model are now described. 
2.1 Demand 
Formally, 𝜃𝑖 denotes the willingeness to pay of tourist i when the weather state is “good”. 𝜃 is 
uniformly distributed over the interval [0;1] across consumers, whose mass is normalized to 1. A 
good weather state may correspond to sunny days for a weekend in a seaside destination, or the 
presence of natural snow for a ski resort. When the weather state is “bad”, however, the willingness 
to pay is reduced to 𝛼𝜃 with 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 1. In a more sophisticated interpretation, to which we will 
return in Section 4, a good state corresponds to a positive holiday evaluation, and a bad state to a 
negative one. Evaluation depends on weather, together with other factors. Formally, denote with 
𝑤 ∈ ℝ a continuous evaluation of weather and with 𝑎 ∈  ℝ a continuous evaluation of all the other 
factors influencing the holiday experience (e.g. natural and cultural attractions). We shall assume 
that the state is good if 𝑤 + 𝑎 is above a reference level, which without loss of generality we can 
normalize to 0, and negative otherwise.  
The demand function is perfectly inelastic: the tourist either buys a holiday or does not buy. Calling 
p the price fixed by the firm, the tourist utility function is: 
𝑢 = 𝜃 − 𝑝                                                                     (1) 
if the tourist buys the holiday and the weather state is good, while it is: 
𝑢 = 𝛼𝜃 − 𝑝                                                                  (2) 
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if the tourist buys the holiday and the weather state is bad. The reservation utility when the tourist 
does not buy is normalized to 0. The tourist buys the holiday, paying the price, before the weather 
state is realized. However, the tourist knows the probability distribution of weather conditions. In 
particular, she knows that the ex ante probability of a good state is 0 < 𝑟 < 1 (the state is bad with 
the complementary probability). Such a probability is common knowledge, and can be interpreted 
as the historical frequency of “good” and “bad” weather in that particular season. Moreover, before 
buying a holiday, tourists receive a signal of the weather conditions, i.e. the weather forecast. The 
signal is correct with a probability of  1
2
≤ 𝑞 < 1, so it conveys useful information to tourists.6 Also 
q is common knowledge.7 As a matter of notation, we will use g and b to denote the realized good 
and bad states, and "g" and "b" to denote the corresponding signals. Therefore, applying the Bayes 
theorem, we get:8 
Pr (𝑏|"b")= (1−𝑟)𝑞(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)                                                      (3) 
Pr (𝑔|"b")= 𝑟(1−𝑞)(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)                                                      (4) 
Pr (𝑔|"g")= 𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)                                                     (5) 
Pr (𝑏|"g")= (1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)
𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)                                                     (6) 
Given such ex post probabilities on weather states, we can write the tourist’s expected utility when 
buying the holiday, conditional on the signals received: 
                                                          
6 The assumption that 𝑞 ≥ 1
2
 is at the same time natural and not restrictive. With 𝑞 < 1
2
, signals would be more likely to 
be correct than incorrect, and that case can be brought back to the case under consideration just by switching the 
signals’ labels.  
7 Notice that we are assuming that tourists have access to a single source of information, and no bias exists in the 
forecast of good and bad weather states. Incidentally, Nelson and Winter (1964) show that such biases can be socially 
optimal. We will briefly consider the role of biases in Section 4. 
8 For Bayes’ theorem, for instance, Pr (𝑏|"b")= Pr (𝑏)Pr ("𝑏"|𝑏)
Pr ("b") . The probability of bad weather is 1 − 𝑟; the probability that 
a bad signal is observed when the true state is bad (i.e. the signal is correct) is q; a bad signal is observed if the weather 
is bad and the signal is correct (probability (1 − 𝑟)𝑞) or the weather is good but the signal is incorrect (probability 
𝑟(1 − 𝑞)).  
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𝐸(𝑢|"g")= 𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)𝜃 + (1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)𝛼𝜃 − 𝑝                               (7) 
 
𝐸(𝑢|"b")= (1−𝑟)𝑞(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)𝛼𝜃 + 𝑟(1−𝑞)(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)𝜃 − 𝑝                          (8) 
Conditional on "g", the tourist buys the holiday when the expected utility is larger than or equal to 
0, i.e. consumers are assumed to be risk-neutral. This is the case if:  
𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)𝑞 𝜃 + (1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)𝛼𝜃 − 𝑝 ≥ 0                                      (9) 
Condition (9) determines a threshold 𝜃�"𝑔" ≡ 𝑝[𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)  such that the tourist buys the holiday if 
and only if her willingness to pay is larger than or equal to 𝜃�"𝑔". Similarly, conditional on "b", the 
tourist buys the holiday when the expected utility is larger than or equal to 0. This is the case if:  
(1−𝑟)𝑞(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)𝛼𝜃 + 𝑟(1−𝑞)(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)𝜃 − 𝑝 ≥ 0                                (10) 
Condition (10) determines a threshold 𝜃�"𝑏" ≡ 𝑝[(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)]𝑟(1−𝑞)+𝛼(1−𝑟)𝑞  such that the tourist buys the holiday 
if and only if their willingness to pay is larger than or equal to 𝜃�"𝑏". It can be shown that 𝜃�"𝑔" ≤ 𝜃�"𝑏", 
where the inequality is strict if 𝛼 < 1. As it is intuitive, a good signal induces to buy even 
consumers with a relatively low willingness to pay.  
Given 𝜃 distribution, the demand functions, conditional on the signals, are derived: 
𝐷"𝑔"(𝑝) = 1 − 𝜃�"𝑔" = 1 − 𝑝[𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞) = 1 − 𝛽"𝑔"𝑝                      (11) 
𝐷"𝑏"(𝑝) = 1 − 𝜃�"𝑏" = 1 − 𝑝[(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)]𝑟(1−𝑞)+𝛼(1−𝑟)𝑞 = 1 − 𝛽"𝑏"𝑝                       (12) 
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where 𝛽"𝑔",𝛽"𝑏" ∈ [1, +∞) are the slope of the linear demand functions. Clearly, 𝛽"𝑔" ≤ 𝛽"𝑏" implies  𝐷"g"(𝑝) ≥ 𝐷"𝑏"(𝑝) for any p (with the equality holding only if 𝛼 = 1). Demand functions are 
represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Demand functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 The supply side and the equilibrium 
The tourist firm operates at zero marginal and fixed costs, and chooses its price, in order to 
maximize profits (or, equivalently, revenues), before the signal is observed. Also the firm is risk-
neutral. 
When the firm fixes its price, the probability that tourists will receive a good signal is [𝑟𝑞 +(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)]. In that case, the firm’s profit will be 𝑝𝐷"𝑔"(𝑝). With a probability of [(1 − 𝑟)𝑞 +
𝑟(1 − 𝑞)], however, consumers will receive a bad signal. In that case, the firm’s profit will 
be 𝑝𝐷"𝑏"(𝑝). Therefore, firms’ expected profits are: 
𝐸Π = [𝑟𝑞 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)]𝑝𝐷"𝑔"(𝑝) + [(1 − 𝑟)𝑞 + 𝑟(1 − 𝑞)]𝑝𝐷"𝑏"(𝑝) = 𝑝𝐸𝐷(𝑝)   (13) 
 
1 
𝐷"g"(𝑝) 
𝐷"b"(𝑝) 
Demand 
Price 
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where ED(p) corresponds to (ex ante) expected level of demand. The first-order condition for profit 
maximization 𝜕𝜕Π
𝜕𝑝
= 0 is:9 
[𝑟𝑞 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)]�1 − 2𝛽"𝑔"𝑝� + [𝑟(1 − 𝑞) + (1 − 𝑟)𝑞]�1 − 2𝛽"𝑔"𝑝�       (14) 
from which we get the equilibrium price: 
𝑝∗ = 1
2�𝛽"𝑔"[𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]+𝛽"𝑏"[𝑟(1−𝑞)+(1−𝑟)𝑞]�                                   (15) 
Since Pr(“g”) = [𝑟𝑞 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)] and Pr(“b”) = [𝑟(1 − 𝑞) + (1 − 𝑟)𝑞], we will define: 
𝐸𝛽 = 𝛽"𝑔"[𝑟𝑞 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)] + 𝛽"𝑏"[𝑟(1 − 𝑞) + (1 − 𝑟)𝑞]      (16) 
i.e.  𝐸𝛽 corresponds to the expected slope of the demand function. Therefore, we can rewrite (15) as 
𝑝∗ = 1
2𝜕𝛽
. This shows that equation (15) identifies an “elasticity rule” (Tirole, 1988), which is 
typical of monopoly pricing, posing an inverse relationship between market power and demand 
elasticity.  
Plugging (15) into (13) we obtain equilibrium expected profit: 
𝐸Π∗ = 1
4𝜕𝛽
                                                                    (17) 
Notice that the expected demand level in equilibrium is constant and equal to 1
2
. A graphical 
representation of the equilibrium is shown in Figure 2. The dark grey area corresponds to 
equilibrium profit.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Second-order conditions are satisfied since the objective function is strictly concave in p. 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Results: weather forecast accuracy, price and social welfare 
In this section we investigate how weather forecast accuracy (q) affects a firm’s price and profit and 
consumer surplus. There are two ways to motivate our analysis. On the one hand, scientific 
literature in meteorology has witnessed a significant increase in the reliability of weather forecasts 
in recent decades, although an exact estimate of weather forecast accuracy is not an easy task 
(Thornes, 1996). Therefore, it is interesting to study what reactions we should expect from firms 
and tourists. On the other hand, the tourist firms’ complaints we mentioned in the Introduction can 
be read, in light of our model, as pointing at the negative effect of a lack of forecast accuracy on 
their performance. So, we can try to verify their claim, irrespectively of its scientific support. 
Furthermore, the analysis allows also to compare a situation where weather forecasts are available 
(𝑞 > 1
2
) and a situation in which, in fact, they are not (𝑞 = 1
2
). 
3.1 Weather forecast accuracy and equilibrium price and profits 
The results obtained in Section 2.2 show that the effect of q on price and profit is uniquely 
determined once the effect on 𝐸𝛽 is known. Therefore, our first proposition determines such an 
effect. The proof is in the Appendix. 
p* 
price 
demand ½ 
1
𝐸𝛽
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Proposition 1 The expected slope of demand is increasing in relation to weather forecast accuracy 
q. Therefore, equilibrium price and profit are decreasing in relation to q.  
The intuition for this result is as follows. In the Appendix we show that 𝑑𝛽"𝑔"
𝑑𝑞
< 0 and 𝑑𝛽"𝑏"
𝑑𝑞
> 0: 
more accurate weather forecasts decrease price sensitiveness when the signal is good (i.e. they make 
demand less elastic, because they increase the expected utility that tourists can obtain from their 
holiday) and increase price sensitiveness when the signal received is bad (i.e. they make demand 
more elastic, because they reduce the expected utility that tourists can obtain from their holiday). It 
turns out that the second effect prevails, so that more accurate weather forecasts reduce the 
equilibrium price. 
3.2 Weather forecast accuracy and consumer surplus 
In order to determine the effect of weather forecast accuracy on tourists, we will look at the impact 
of q on net expected utility. It turns out that all tourists are (weakly) better off following an increase 
in forecast accuracy, from which Proposition 2 follows.  
Proposition 2 Consumer surplus is increasing in relation to weather forecast accuracy. 
Tourists benefit from accurate weather forecasting for two reasons. First of all, the price is lower; 
second, weather forecasts allow tourists to make more informed decisions. As a matter of fact, it is 
this superior information that weather forecasts provide to tourists that puts pressure on firms, 
leading to lower prices. 
4. Discussion: managerial and policy implications 
To summarize, the results obtained in the previous section suggest that accurate weather forecasts, 
rather than inaccurate ones, may be detrimental to firm profitability. Therefore, tourist firms should 
in fact be concerned about the increasingly accurate weather forecasts that scientific and technical 
knowledge are able to provide.  
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In order to mitigate the negative effect of weather forecasts, the firm itself and the destination 
authority should act in order to decrease the relative importance of weather in determining holiday 
evaluation. In particular, in the more sophisticated interpretation of what states are in the model 
(Section 2.1), a good state corresponds to a positive holiday evaluation, and a bad state to a negative 
one, with evaluation depending on weather conditions (w), together with all the other factors (a), 
such as cultural and natural attractions, that contribute to the holiday experience. While weather 
conditions are clearly exogenous, the firm and the destination authority may invest to increase a, i.e. 
the quality of the service offered or the attractiveness of the destination. The higher a is, the lower 
the value of w that is needed to produce a positive holiday experience, i.e. for a given distribution of 
weather conditions, private and public investments may in fact increase r, minimizing demand 
elasticity and reducing the marginal impact of q on firm profitability.10 
At the same time, the technical feasibility of more accurate forecasting does not necessarily 
translate into forecasts that are actually more accurate. A full analysis endogenizing accuracy is 
outside the scope of this paper (see Anbarci et al. 2011 for a recent attempt in this direction), but a 
brief, and relatively informal, discussion of the role of symmetry in forecasting accuracy (i.e. that 
signals are equally precise for good and bad states) is in order. In fact, allegations of tourist firms 
against forecast providers often consist in blaming them for their “pessimism” or “alarmism”, which 
would make their bad weather forecasts only less reliable. In the Appendix we show that the general 
way to express the impact of q on 𝐸𝛽 can be written as follows: 
𝑑𝜕𝛽
𝑑𝑞
= 𝑑𝑑𝑟("𝑔")
𝑑𝑞
𝛽"𝑔" + 𝑑𝛽("𝑔")𝑑𝑞 𝑃𝑟("𝑔") + 𝑑𝑑𝑟("𝑏")𝑑𝑞 𝛽"𝑏" + 𝑑𝛽("𝑏")𝑑𝑞 𝑃𝑟("𝑏")            (18) 
In fact, q should be interpreted as the subjective tourists’ perception of accuracy, as long as it is 
common knowledge with the firm. As a consequence, pessimism and alarmism would imply a value 
of q higher than its objective value only for bad signals, implying in (18) an increase both in 
                                                          
10 Notice that in Equation (A8) in the proof of Proposition 1, 𝑑𝜕𝛽
𝑑𝑞
→0 for 𝑟 → 1. 
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𝑃𝑟("𝑏") and 𝑑𝛽("𝑏")
𝑑𝑞
. In turn, this would increase further the value of 𝑑𝜕𝛽
𝑑𝑞
 with a negative impact on 
the firm’s price and profit. It follows that if i) bad weather forecasts are unreliable, but ii) tourists 
are not aware of this, then initiatives by destination authorities to produce unbiased forecasts may 
be profit enhancing for the firms in the destination.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we developed a model to assist in understanding the effect of weather forecasts on 
tourists’ and firms’ decisions. Our results show that the price chosen by the firm and the 
corresponding equilibrium profit are decreasing in relation to the accuracy of weather forecasts: 
contrary to the common claims of tourist firms, accurate weather forecasts, rather than inaccurate 
ones, may be detrimental to their profitability. Accurate weather forecasts allow tourists to make 
more informed decisions, and therefore put pressure on prices. Firms (and destination authorities) 
can mitigate the negative effect of weather forecasts by actively investing in improving the tourist 
experience irrespectively of weather (for instance, through culture-based attractions), while the 
public provision of weather forecasts by destination authorities may be justified only in the presence 
of biased, pessimistic forecasts.  
In future work, we would like to study the effects of various forms of insurance on firms’ and 
tourists’ behaviour, by relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality on the tourists’ and firms’ side. For 
tourist firms, weather derivatives (Bank and Wiesner, 2011) may be an important tool, to a large 
extent unexplored. As an alternative, tourist firms (and destination authorities) could themselves 
insure tourists against the risk of bad weather conditions. A recent attempt in this direction has been 
made by Jesolo,11 in the Veneto region of Italy. Such investigations could be performed both 
theoretically and through field experiments, where real tourists’ reactions to different insurance 
schemes can be analysed.  
                                                          
11 See http://www.jesolospiagge.it/en/suntanned-or-your-money-back.html. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. The impact of q on 𝐸𝛽 is given by 
𝑑𝜕𝛽
𝑑𝑞
= 𝑑𝑑𝑟("g")
𝑑𝑞
𝛽"𝑔" + 𝑑𝛽("g")𝑑𝑞 Pr(g) + 𝑑𝑑𝑟("𝑏")𝑑𝑞 𝛽"𝑏" + 𝑑𝛽("𝑏")𝑑𝑞 𝑃𝑟("𝑏")            (A1) 
 
We first compute, through simple derivations, 𝑑𝛽"𝑔"
𝑑𝑞
, 𝑑𝛽"𝑏"
𝑑𝑞
, 𝑑𝑑𝑟("𝑔")
𝑑𝑞
 and 𝑑𝑑𝑟("𝑏")
𝑑𝑞
: 
 
𝑑𝛽"𝑔"
𝑑𝑞
= − 𝑟(1−𝑟)(1−𝛼)[𝑟(1−𝑞)+𝛼(1−𝑟)𝑞]2 < 0                                               (A2) 
𝑑𝛽"𝑏"
𝑑𝑞
= 𝑟(1−𝑟)(1−𝛼)[𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]2 > 0                                                   (A3) 
𝑑𝑑𝑟("𝑔")
𝑑𝑞
= 2𝑟 − 1                                                                    (A4) 
𝑑𝑑𝑟("𝑏")
𝑑𝑞
= 1 − 2𝑟                                                                    (A5) 
Substituting (A2)-(A5) into (A1), we get: 
 
𝑑𝜕𝛽
𝑑𝑞
= (2𝑟 − 1) 𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)
𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞) − [𝑟(1−𝑟)(1−𝛼)][𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)][𝑟(1−𝑞)+𝛼(1−𝑟)𝑞]2   +(1 − 2𝑟) 𝑟(1−𝑞)+(1−𝑟)𝑞
𝑟(1−𝑞)+𝛼(1−𝑟)𝑞 + [𝑟(1−𝑟)(1−𝛼)][(1−𝑟)𝑞+𝑟(1−𝑞)][𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]2                        (A6) 
which has the same sign as: [𝑟𝑞 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)][𝑟(1 − 𝑞) + 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)𝑞]2�(2𝑟 − 1)�𝑟𝑞 + 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)� − 𝑟(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)� 
−[𝑟(1 − 𝑞) + (1 − 𝑟)𝑞][𝑟𝑞 + 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)]2[(2𝑟 − 1)(𝑟(1 − 𝑞) + 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)𝑞) − 𝑟(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)]              (A7) 
Simplifying (A7) one obtains: 
𝑟2(1 − 𝑟)2(2𝑞 − 1)(𝑟(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼)                                            (A8) 
which is a positive quantity.  
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Proof of Proposition 2. In order to show that consumer surplus is increasing in q we prove that the 
expected net utility for each consumer is (weakly) greater after an increase in q.  
First, we note the following. Since 𝜃�"𝑔" ≤ 𝜃�"𝑏" there are three types of consumers: i) consumers who 
buy no matter what the signal is; ii) consumers who buy only when the signal is “good”; iii) 
consumers who do not buy, irrespective of the signal.  
Consider consumers intially buying when receiving both signals, and suppose first that they do not 
change their decisions after an increase in q. Their expected net utility in equilibrum is given by:  
𝑟𝜃 + (1 − 𝑟)𝛼𝜃 − 𝑝∗                                                    (A9)  
which is increasing in q since the equilibrium price is decreasing in q. If consumers change their 
decision after the variation in q, it follows that they can get a higher expected utility. 
Consider consumers initially not buying when receiving both signals, and suppose first they do not 
change their decision after the variation in q. Their expected net utility is 0. These consumers are 
clearly unaffected by the increase in q. If consumers change their decision after the variation in q, it 
follows that they can get a positive expected utility by doing so.  
Finally, consider consumers who buy only when receiving a good signal. The expected net utility 
for those agents is: 
𝑟𝑞𝜃 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)𝛼𝜃 − 𝑝(𝑟𝑞 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞))                (A10) 
The derivative of this quantity with respect to q is: 
𝜃[𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] − 𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑞
�𝑟𝑞 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)� − 𝑝(2𝑟 − 1) > 0        (A11) 
Since 𝑑𝑝∗
𝑑𝑞
< 0, the derivative is surely positive if 𝜃[𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] − 𝑝(2𝑟 − 1) > 0. Let us assume 
first that (2𝑟 − 1) > 0. Since the tourist goes on holiday when the signal is good, it must be 
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𝜃 ≥
𝑝[𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]
𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞) . Then, if we prove that 𝑝[𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞) [𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] − 𝑝(2𝑟 − 1) ≥ 0, this 
implies that 𝜃[𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] − 𝑝(2𝑟 − 1) > 0 (since 2𝑟 − 1 > 0 implies 𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟) > 0). This 
is proven in a few steps: 
𝑝[𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]
𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞) [𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] − 𝑝(2𝑟 − 1) ≥ 0                         (A12) 
𝑟(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼) > 0                                                      (A13) 
Suppose now that (2𝑟 − 1) < 0, but 𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟) > 0. Then 𝜃[𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] − 𝑝(2𝑟 − 1) > 0. 
Finally, suppose that 𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟) < 0. Since the tourist does not go on holiday when the signal is 
bad, it must be 𝜃 < 𝑝[𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]
𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞) . Then, if 𝑝[𝑟𝑞+(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞)]𝑟𝑞+𝛼(1−𝑟)(1−𝑞) [𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] − 𝑝(2𝑟 − 1) ≥ 0, then 
𝜃[𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] − 𝑝(2𝑟 − 1) > 0. Again, this is proved in a few steps: 
[𝑟𝑞 + (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)][𝑟 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)] ≥ 𝑟𝑞 + 𝛼(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑞)(2𝑟 − 1)      (A14) 
𝑟(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼) > 0                                                     (A15) 
Also in this case, if tourists change their choice after the variation in q, this means that an even 
higher utility is obtained by acting in this way.  
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